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k-Anonymity protects privacy by ensuring that data can-
not be linked to a single individual. In a k-anonymous
dataset, any identifying information occurs in at least k
tuples. Much research has been done to modify a single
table dataset to satisfy anonymity constraints. This paper
extends the definitions of k-anonymity to multiple relations
and shows that previously proposed methodologies either
fail to protect privacy, or overly reduce the utility of the
data, in a multiple relation setting. A new clustering algo-
rithm is proposed to achieve multirelational anonymity.
1 Introduction
The tension between the value of using personal data
for research, and concern over individual privacy, is ever-
increasing. Simply removing uniquely identifying infor-
mation (SSN, name) from data is not sufficient to pre-
vent identification because partially identifying information
(age, gender . . . ) can still be mapped to individuals by using
external knowledge[16]. k-Anonymity[13] is one technique
to protect against the linkage and identification of records.
In k-anonymous table, each distinct tuple (in the projection
over identifying attributes) occurs at least k times. Private
tables are k-anonymized by the use of generalizations and
suppressions, providing two key properties:
• In the anonymous dataset, an individual can only be
linked to a group of at least k private entities.
• Every tuple of the anonymous dataset correctly repre-
sents a unique tuple in the private dataset (There is no
false or noisy information.)
k-Anonymity does not enforce diversity on the sensitive
information of equivalence classes (set of tuples with the
same identifying attributes in k-anonymous dataset). This
has lead to extended privacy definitions [6, 11].
To achieve k-anonymity in single-table datasets, numer-
ous generalization (replacing data values with more gen-
eral values) and suppression algorithms have been proposed
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[14, 7, 8, 9, 4, 10, 3, 5, 12]. These algorithms assume each
private entity is stored as one row in a single attribute-value
table. When information about a private entity is contained
in multiple tables, and not easily represented in a single
table, the existing definitions and algorithms are insuffi-
cient. Section 2 extends k-anonymity definitions for the
multi-Relational setting; Section 3 discusses why multiR
anonymity (multirelational k-anonymity) is a new problem
that is not solved by previous k-anonymity algorithms. In
Section 4, protected entities and associated relations will
be abstracted by trees and a modification of a previously
proposed clustering algorithm will be presented to provide
multiR anonymity on snowflake schemas.
2 MultiR Anonymity
We now define notations and k-anonymity for the mul-
tiR setting. Given a table T , T [c][r] refers to the value of
column c, row r of T . T [c] is the projection of column c
Definition 1 (MultiR schema) A set of tables SU and a
set of functional dependencies SF corresponds to a multiR
schema if SU is a dependency preserving, lossless join de-
composition with respect to SF and there exists one person
specific table PT ∈ SU where each row corresponds to an
individual in population U . We say a database with such
a schema has the transcript MR(SF, U, PT, ST, vip),
where vip is the unique identifier in PT and ST = SU −
{PT }.
Table 1 shows an example for a multiR database with
transcript MR(SF, U, Tp, {T1, T2}, Sid) where SF={Sid
→ GPA, SCid → {Sid, Course, Grade} } and U is the set
of students. The schema is in BCNF and dependency pre-
serving. The following quasi-identifier definition is a refor-
mulation of the definition in [15].
Definition 2 (Quasi-identifier) Let
MR(SF, U, PT, {T1, T2, ...Tn}, vip) be a multiR
database, and JT = PT  T1  · · ·  Tn. Let
fc : U → JT and fg : JT → U ′, where U ⊆ U ′. A quasi-
identifier of MR, written QMR, is a subset of attributes of
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SCid Sid Course Grade
SC1 S1 Math 93
SC2 S1 Physics 91
SC3 S1 History 85
SC4 S2 CS 78
SC5 S2 Physics 62
SC6 S2 Religion 42
SC7 S3 History 85
SC8 S3 Religion 75
SC9 S3 Physics 77
SC10 S4 History 98












SC10 Am. Hist $54






SCid Sid Course Grade
SC1 S1 Science 93
SC2 S1 Physics 91
SC3 S1 Social 85
SC4 S2 Science 78
SC5 S2 Physics 62
SC6 S2 Social 42
SC7 S3 History 85
SC8 S3 Religion 77
* * * *
SC10 S4 History 98





SC3 Relg Book $33
SC4 Discrete $65
SC5 Dynamics $51
SC6 Relg Book $38
SC7 Hist Book $49
* * *
SC10 Hist Book $54
JT where ∃pi ∈ U such that fg(fc(pi)[QMR]) = pi, and
an adversary knows the values of QMR for pi.
Informally a quasi-identifier for a schema is the set of at-
tributes in JT that can be used to externally link or identify
a given tuple in PT . In Table 1, Course and Book attributes
can be considered quasi-identifiers since colleagues of a stu-
dent may know this information about their friend. The at-
tributes GPA, Grade, Price are the sensitive attributes of the
private entity Sid. An attacker knows the quasi-identifiers
about an entity and tries to discover other (sensitive) infor-
mation in the data. E.g., in Table 1, we assume the attacker
knows that some individual George in U takes the courses
History and Religion and uses the text book American His-
tory for History course. The attacker wants to discover
George’s (sensitive) GPA or his grade in History course. If
the data is released as it is, even though George’s name is
hidden, the attacker can easily link George to student S4 and
GPA 4.00 or SCid SC10 and grade 98. We also have other
join keys in Table 1 like the vip attribute Sid or SCid that
are not part of the quasi-identifier set.
To simplify notation, given database MRi we will use
the notation vipi for a private entity in MRi, PTi for the
person specific table of MRi (table where vipi is the pri-
mary key), STi for the set of all tables in MRi excluding
PTi, JTi for the join of all tables in MRi, QMRi for set of
quasi identifier attributes, and SMRi for the set of sensitive
attributes of MRi.
Definition 3 (Structurally Equivalent) Two databases
MR1 and MR2 have structurally equivalent schemas if
and only if vip1 = vip2, PT1 has the same set of attributes
as PT2, and there exist bijective mapping between the set
of tables ST1 and ST2 such that tables mapped have the
same set of attributes. Structurally equivalent schemas
have the same func. dependencies, population, QI, sensitive
and non-QI joining attribute sets.
Definition 4 (k-anonymity for multiR databases) Let
MR1 and MR2 be two multiR databases with the same set
of QI set QMR and set of sensitive attributes SMR. We say
MR2 is a k-anonymization of MR1 if and only if ∀v(JT2)
(views on JT2) the following properties hold:
1. anonymized: any query of the type Πatt(v(JT2))
where att ∈ SMR returns either zero tuples or at least
k (not necessarily distinct) tuples,
2. anonymized w.r.t. individuals: any query of the type
Πvip(v(JT2)) returns either zero tuples or at least k
distinct tuples, and
3. correct: tuples in JT1 and JT2 can be ordered such a
way that for all possible j, JT2[att][j] is equal to or
some generalization of JT1[att][j] if att ∈ QMR and
JT2[att][j] is equal to JT1[att][j] if att ∈ SMR
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Figure 1. Course, Book DGH structures
The part ‘k not necessarily distinct tuples’ in require-
ment 1 can be changed to ‘k distinct tuples’ if we assume
all sensitive information in the MR1 is unique. MR1 and
the k-anonymous MR2 need not be structurally equivalent,
however, we will see that equivalence eases the anonymiza-
tion process and can improve utility of the dataset.
The example in Table 1 is clearly not
k-anonymous even for k = 2, as ΠSid
(σCourse=“History′′∧Book=“Am.Hist′′ (JT )) = {S4}.
Table 2 shows a 2-anonymization of Table 1 using general-
izations from the domain generalization hierarchies given
in Figure 1; the same query on Table 2 returns no tuples.
Theorem 1 Let MR be a k-anonymous multiR database
where ST = {T1, T2, ...Tn} and k ≤ 2. Then for every
vip value vp, there exist some k − 1 distinct vip values vp1,
vp2, · · · vpk−1 such that for every view v possible if vp ∈
Πvip(v(JT )) then vp1, vp2, · · · vpk−1 ∈ Πvip(v′(JT ))
also. We say the set Svp = {vp, vp1, vp2, · · · vpk−1} is the
equivalence class of vp and write ECMR(vp) = Svp.
PROOF. Suppose this is not the case and let the set of
views Vvp = {vi|vp ∈ Πvip(vi(JT )) ∧ |Πvip(vi(JT ))| ≥
k}. Since there are no common k− 1 vip values (other than
vp) over all views then we have | ∩vi∈Vvp Πvip(vi(JT ))| <
k. Constructing the view v∩ = ∩vi∈Vvpvi gives
|Πvip(v∩(JT ))| ≤ k and vp ∈ Πvip(v∩(JT )), violating
the k-anonymity constraint. This gives a contradiction.
Theorem 1 can be modified for only sensitive attributes
if we have unique sensitive values. Every sensitive value s
in the data belongs to a set ECs of at least k sensitive values
such that if s is in a query result then every element in ECs
is also in that query result.
The k-anonymity definition for a multiR database is not
arbitrary. If an attacker faces the same set of private entities
in every possible set of queries, it can only map its external
knowledge to that set. Requirement 3 for k-anonymity pre-
vents false information being included in the anonymiza-
tion of the original database. (Otherwise there would be
trivial solutions for k-anonymization such as replication of
tuples. This requirement holds also for classical, single-
table k-anonymity, although it was not included explicitly in
its definition.) Note that the definitions and concepts given
here subsume the definitions of single-table k-anonymity.
3 Single Table Algorithms for MultiR
Anonymity
We now explore some obvious approaches to achiev-
ing multiR anonymity using single table k-anonymity algo-
rithms. The main idea is to convert the multiR database into
one or more single tables and anonymize these. For each
approach, we describe why it does not give satisfactory re-
sults; the insights are useful in understanding the algorithm
we will give in Section 4.
One solution would be to construct the universal relation
from the multiR database and anonymize this relation. The
problem is that a private entity may become multiple rows
in the universal relation, which will likely anonymize with
each other, making the relation “k-anonymous” but failing
to protect individual identity. In Table 1, the join of Tp and
T1 will already be 2-anonymous w.r.t. QI attributes when
we anonymize the entry CS with entry Math to create two
entries of Science. But if an attacker knows that Chris is
taking History, Math and Physics, then it will map Chris to
S1 since S1 is the only one taking Physics, History and a
Science course. Eliminating the join keys would help, but
will damage the relational structure we want to preserve.
If we instead blindly apply anonymizations to each single
dataset we have the same shortcomings. E.g., applying lo-
cal anonymization on Tp and T1 will create semanticly the
same output datasets as the above example.
Some multiR databases can be converted to a boolean
vector “bitmap” format with every private entity as a single
row, and distinct attributes used to reflect different values.
Table 3 shows the bitmap version of the MR database given
in Table 1 and its 2-anonymization. Classical k-anonymity
algorithms can be run on such datasets. The anonymized
data will then satisfy both multiR anonymity requirements
for certain types of relations, however:
• Schemas containing tables that map one entity to
another entity an arbitrary number times cannot be
converted to bitmap format without information loss.
(E.g., a student taking n different Physic classes where
n is arbitrarily large cannot be readily expressed.)
• Anonymization would only be through suppression, as
generalizing “S1 is taking a Math course and S2 is tak-
ing a CS course” into “S1 and S2 are both taking a sci-
ence course” would correspond to merging columns in
the schema rather than generalization of data.
• Conversion to bitmap format produces datasets of high
dimensionality. The difficulty of anonymizing a high
3
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dimension table without significant amount of infor-
mation loss is discussed in [1].
Additional shortcomings of bitmap anonymization include
lack of flexibility for certain heuristics, functional depen-
dency inference attacks, and for some databases, insuffi-
cient sensitive information protection; further discussion is
omitted due to space limitations.
4 Clustering-based MultiR Anonymity
We now develop a multiR anonymity algorithm that
overcomes the shortcomings of the approaches described in
the previous section, although it places certain (reasonable)
restrictions on the schemas supported. Algorithms for ar-
bitrary schemas are left as future work. We first give key
properties about the database that the algorithm is expected
to preserve, then detail the assumptions about the schema.
Schema Preservation: The schemas of the input
database MR and the k-anonymous output MR∗ will be
structurally equivalent (Definition 3).
Dependency Preservation: The anonymized database
preserves the atomicity of join keys and functional depen-
dencies of the original database, so that:
1. the semantics of the data are better preserved, and
2. inference attacks, by an adversary who knows a func-
tional dependency that fails to hold in the anonymized
data, are prevented.
We require that the schema be normalized to enforce de-
pendencies; this obviates the need to provide dependencies
separately as input to the anonymization algorithm.
Snowflake Schema: The algorithm we present is limited
to schemas satisfying the following constraints:
1. No connection keys (primary/foreign keys) between
tables in MR are quasi-identifiers.
2. Every table in ST contains only one foreign key. Table
PT does not contain a foreign key.
3. We say a table T2 belongs to the family of T1 and write
T2 ∈ F (T1) if T2 has a foreign key attribute which is a
primary key attribute either in T1 or in another family
member of T1. We restrict ourselves to schemas with
F (PT ) = ST .
Schemas with these constraints are similar to snowflake
relations where the fact table is the table PT (see Fig-
ure 2), although we do support one to many relationships
between PT and other tables. Any table in the schema
can contain sensitive attributes, anonymity constraint 1 will
hold for all of them. This family of schemas is expres-
sive enough for many database applications (XML, spatio-
temporal databases, data warehouses, ...)
We now present a MiRaCle anonymization algorithm
Student has GPA
Sensitive: GPA




Non QI PK: SCid
Sensitive: Grade
Non QI FK: Sid
Student bought 
Books for Course 
paying Price 













Projects for Course 
with Grade
Sensitive: PGrade
Non QI FK: SCid
Figure 2. Schema graph
that anonymizes a given multiR database under the assump-
tions given in the previous section. MiRaCle is a clustering-
based anonymity algorithm; any distance-based clustering
k-anonymity algorithm [5, 12, 2] can be used as a basic
skeleton for MiRaCle anonymizations. Due to space con-
straints, we only sketch such modification.
The main observation is that all clustering based
anonymity algorithms make use of two basic operations on
private entities: anonymization and calculation of the dis-
tance between two entities. The latter can be generally de-
fined as the cost of the anonymization of two entities. The
assumptions given in the previous section enables us to ab-
stract private entities of multiR databases as trees where
each level of a given entity tree corresponds to levels of the
nested relation for a particular vip entity (Figure 3 gives an
example.) The challenge is to anonymize two trees of simi-
lar structure with respect to each other.
Algorithm 1 anonymize(tree(s1), tree(s2))
Require: For a tree node s; tree(s1) returns the tree rooted from
s and vs returns the QI attribute values associated with node
s. For two values of the same domain v1 and v2, gen(v1, v2)
returns the lowest cost generalization of v1 and v2 w.r.t. dgh
structure defined over the associated domain
1: let C1 be the set of child nodes of node S1
2: let C2 be the set of child nodes of node S2
3: find a low cost pairing of nodes in S1 and S2
4: for all pairs of nodes (c1 ∈ C1, c2 ∈ C2) matched do
5: vc1 , vc2 = gen(vc1 , vc2)
6: anonymize(tree(c1), tree(c2))
7: for all nodes (c ∈ C1 ∪ C2) unmatched do
8: suppress every value in nodes of tree(c)
Algorithm 1 shows how to anonymize two entity trees.
Anonymization occurs top-down. Each tree root has
a set of child nodes. (In Figure 3, children of S1
and S2: C1 = {Math, Physics, History}, C2 =
{CS, Physics, Religion}.) The algorithm chooses pair-
ings of nodes between these sets to minimize the local cost
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Table 3. Bitmap version of MR without some of the sensitive attributes and its 2-anonymization,
attribute T in each course shows whether the student has taken that course or not.
Sid Math Physics CS History Religion GPA
T Di T Ca Dyn T Di T RH Ot AH T Yo
S1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3.72
S2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2.34
S3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 3.12
S4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 4.00
S1 * * 1 * 1 * * * * 0 0 * * 3.72
S2 * * 1 * 1 * * * * 0 0 * * 2.34
S3 0 0 * * 0 0 0 1 0 * * 1 * 3.12
S4 0 0 * * 0 0 0 1 0 * * 1 * 4.00
S1
Math Physics History
Disc. Calc. Dyn. R. Hist.
3.72
93 91 85









Disc. * Dyn. Relg.
3.72
93 91 85







Figure 3. Anonymization of students S1 and
S2 from the example MR database in Table 1
in the current level or the overall cost of the anonymized
trees. (In Figure 3, Math is paired with CS, Physics with
Physics, and History with Religion, producing the set nodes
{Science, Physics, Social} which are the least costly sets in
terms of cost metrics such as LM.) Since each pair are two
trees to be anonymized, values of the roots are anonymized
and function is called on the subtrees. (In Figure 3, Math
and CS values are changed to Science and a second call
is made on (tree(Science1), tree(Science2)). Unpaired
nodes are suppressed (e.g., node Calc.)
References
[1] C. C. Aggarwal, “On k-anonymity and the curse of dimensionality,”
in VLDB ’05: Proceedings of the 31st international conference on
Very large data bases. VLDB Endowment, 2005, pp. 901–909.
[2] G. Agrawal, T. Feder, K. Kenthapadi, S. Khuller, R. Panigrahy,
D. Thomas, and A. Zhu, “Achieving anonymity via clustering,” in
PODS ’06: Proc. of the 25th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART sym-
posium on Principles of database systems, Chicago, IL, USA, June
26-28 2006, pp. 153–162.
[3] K. W. B. Fung and P. Yu, “Top-down specialization for information
and privacy preservation,” in Proc. of the 21st Int’l Conf. on Data
Engineering, 2005.
[4] R. Bayardo and R. Agrawal, “Data privacy through optimal k-
anonymization,” in Proc. of the 21st Int’l Conf. on Data Engineering,
2005.
[5] J. Domingo-Ferrer and V. Torra, “Ordinal, continuous and hetero-
geneous k-anonymity through microaggregation,” Data Min. Knowl.
Discov., vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 195–212, 2005.
[6] A. O. hrn and L. Ohno-Machado, “Using boolean reasoning
to anonymize databases,” Artificial Intelligence in Medicine,
vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 235–254, Mar. 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S0933-3657(98)00056-6
[7] A. Hundepool and L. Willenborg, “µ and t-argus: software for statis-
tical disclosure control,” in Third International Seminar on Statistical
Confidentiality, 1996.
[8] V. Iyengar, “Transforming data to satisfy privacy constraints,” in
Proc., the Eigth ACM SIGKDD Int’l Conf. on Knowledge Discovery
and Data Mining, 2002, pp. 279–288.
[9] K. LeFevre, D. DeWitt, and R. Ramakrishnan, “Incognito: Efficient
full-domain k-anonymity,” in Proc. of the 2005 ACM SIGMOD Int’l
Conf. on Management of Data, Baltimore, MD, June 13-16 2005.
[10] K. LeFevre, D. DeWitt, and R. Ramakrishnan, “Multidimensional
k-anonymity,” University of Wisconsin, Madison, Tech. Rep. 1521,
June 2005. http://www.cs.wisc.edu/techreports/2005/TR1521.pdf
[11] A. Machanavajjhala, J. Gehrke, D. Kifer, and M. Venkitasubrama-
niam, “l-diversity: Privacy beyond k-anonymity,” in Proc. of the
22nd IEEE Int’l Conf. on Data Engineering (ICDE 2006), Atlanta
Georgia, Apr. 2006.
[12] M. E. Nergiz and C. Clifton, “Thoughts on k-anonymization,” in
ICDEW ’06: Proc. of the 22nd Int’l Conf. on Data Engineering
Workshops. Atlanta, GA, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2006,
p. 96.
[13] P. Samarati, “Protecting respondents’ identities in microdata release,”
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 13,
no. 6, pp. 1010–1027, 2001.
[14] L. Sweeney, “Guaranteeing anonymity when sharing medical data,
the datafly system,” in Proc., Journal of the American Medical Infor-
matics Association. Hanley & Belfus, Inc., 1997.
[15] L. Sweeney, “Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using gen-
eralization and suppression,” International Journal on Uncertainty,
Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, vol. 10, no. 5, 2002.
[16] L. Sweeney, “k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy,” Int. J.
Uncertain. Fuzziness Knowl.-Based Syst., vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 557–
570, 2002.
5
1-4244-0803-2/07/$20.00 ©2007 IEEE 1421
